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Abstract 
The present studies investigate the hypothesis that guilt influences risk-taking by enhancing 
one’s sense of control. Across multiple inductions of guilt, we demonstrate that experimentally 
induced guilt enhances optimism about risks for the self (Study 1), preferences for gambles 
versus guaranteed payoffs (Studies 2, 4, and 6), and the likelihood that one will engage in risk-
taking behaviors (Study 5). In addition, we demonstrate that guilt enhances the sense of control 
over uncontrollable events, an illusory control (Studies 3, 4, and 5), and found that a model with 
illusory control as a mediator is consistent with the data (Studies 5 and 6). We also found that a 
model with feelings of guilt as a mediator, but not generalized negative affect, fits the data 
(Study 4). Finally, we examined the relative explanatory power of different appraisals and found 
that appraisals of illusory control best explain the influence of guilt on risk-taking (Study 6). 
These results provide the first empirical demonstration of the influence of guilt on sense of 
control and risk-taking, extend previous theorizing on guilt, and more generally contribute to our 
understanding of how specific emotions influence cognition and behavior.   FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       4 
The experience of guilt brings the self into sharp negative focus, but ironically promotes 
productive behavior in its aftermath: when individuals feel guilty, they are motivated to act (e.g., 
Lewis, 1971). Realizing that they have failed to live up to their standards, people attempt to undo 
their actions, repair their relationships, and bring future actions in line with their morals (e.g., 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In this paper, we identify another behavioral consequence of feeling 
guilty: an enhanced tendency to take risks. 
Specifically, we pursue three aims relevant to guilt and risk. First, we examine how the 
experience of guilt influences risk-related judgments, including optimism about future risks, the 
preference for gambles over guaranteed payoffs, and perceptions of the likelihood of engaging in 
future risks, which correlate with real-world risk-taking behaviors (Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 
2006). Second, we investigate a potential mechanism of the influence of guilt on risk: an illusory 
sense of control. To do so, we examine how the experience of guilt enhances perceived control 
over uncontrollable outcomes and whether an enhanced sense of control can explain the 
influence of guilt on risk-taking judgments. 
An Appraisal Tendency Account of Emotional Influences on Risk-taking 
  In this paper, we take an appraisal tendency approach to the influence of emotion on risk-
taking (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 
2001; Siemer, 2001). This theory presumes that specific emotions both arise from and leave 
behind particular sets of enhanced cognitive appraisals. The experience of a specific emotion, 
then, creates a tendency to view subsequent events through the lens of that particular emotion’s 
associated appraisals, thus impacting relevant judgments and behaviors. Several studies have 
contrasted the emotion-specific appraisal tendency effects of anger and fear in the domain of 
risk. Anger and fear are both negative emotions, but anger is associated with appraisals of FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       5 
personal control and certainty whereas fear is associated with appraisals of situational control 
and uncertainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Consistent with this appraisal analysis, trait fear is 
associated with decreased and trait anger with increased estimates of the occurrence of risky 
events (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), optimism about whether risky events will happen to the self 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and preference for gambles versus “sure thing” options in the Asian 
Disease problem (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Likewise, induced fear decreases and anger increases 
optimism about whether risky events will happen to the self, and appraisals of control mediate 
these judgments (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). 
  These results dovetail with work from decision science demonstrating that appraisals of 
certainty and control are the two central dimensions governing decisions about risk. To the 
extent that the consequences of an activity are viewed as uncertain (“unknown risk”) and 
uncontrollable (“dread risk”), that activity is perceived to be more risky (Slovic, 1987). It is 
interesting to note that the control appraisal factor, rather than the certainty appraisal factor, is 
the critical one in influencing individuals’ desire to avoid or reduce the risks of a particular 
activity (Slovic, 1987). In addition, individuals who perceive high personal control over their 
environment are more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 
1994). Thus, we propose that other emotions associated with an enhanced or diminished sense of 
control are likely to influence risk perceptions and risk-taking behavior. Guilt is one such 
emotion; guilt is defined by appraisals of personal control but is not centrally defined by 
appraisals of certainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Here, we investigate 
whether guilt diminishes perceptions of risk and promotes risk-taking behavior. 
Guilt, Risk-taking, and Control 
Guilt, an emotion experienced when an individual’s behavior fails to meet their standards FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       6 
(Lazarus, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), plays an important role in driving behavior. The 
feeling of guilt is produced when “individuals evaluate their behavior as failure but focus on 
specific features or actions of the self that led to the failure” (Lewis, 2008: 748). The feeling is 
directed to the cause of failure, rather than self; as a result, guilt leads to corrective action to 
repair failure (Lewis, 1971). Guilt weighs heavily on the psyche; when individuals experience 
guilt, they become motivated to change their circumstances, to alleviate their feelings of guilt, 
and more generally to take action (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984). Guilt also plays a critical role in 
promoting prosocial, moral behavior (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Izard, 1977; 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
In this paper, we argue that guilt promotes risk-taking. Intuitively, however, the opposite 
proposition—that guilt should lead to less risky behavior—may seem more likely. Indeed, some 
research shows that guilt proneness is inversely related to risky behavior. For instance, guilt-
prone college students are less likely to abuse drugs and alcohol (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 
2005). However, guilt proneness is characterized by the anticipation of feeling bad, not guilty, 
after an eliciting event. The argument supporting this claim builds on the idea that, as an 
uncomfortable emotion, guilt drives less risky behavior to avoid experiencing further guilt or 
other negative emotions associated with failure. Here, we test the idea that guilt instead increases 
optimism and preferences for risk as well as the likelihood of risk-taking behavior. This should 
occur, we reason, because guilt enhances perceived control over one’s environment. Individuals 
appraise guilt-inducing events with attributions of self-responsibility for failure, and enhanced 
appraisals that events are controllable (Tracy & Robins, 2006), a feature shared by positive 
emotions such as joy and happiness, and by the negative emotion anger (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter 
Schure, 1989; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Although guilt belongs to the FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       7 
class of emotions featuring a negative self-evaluation (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), such that 
one’s actions are appraised negatively, the appraisal process signals that one was in control of 
doing something wrong (i.e., responsible for it); thus, the experience of guilt results in action 
tendencies to correct the wrongdoing and make reparations to those harmed (Frijda et al., 1989; 
Lewis, 1971). Guilt implies that the self is able to act to restore moral order (Lewis, 1971). A 
causal effect of control beliefs on guilt has been documented previously (Berndsen & Manstead, 
2007), but, no study has yet demonstrated that guilt increases sense of control. 
In a set of studies, Lindsay-Hartz and colleagues found that participants providing guilt 
descriptions used the terms, “I could” and “I could have” frequently and were convinced that 
they had some control over the situation (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz, Rivera, Mascolo, 
1995). Sense of control (or agency) and taking action are highly interrelated (Haggard & 
Tsakiris, 2009); if individuals think they do not have any control, they lose their motivation to 
act (Skinner, 1996). On the other hand, performing an action makes people feel a sense of 
control. Even the mere prime of potential action before an action itself is performed enhances 
feelings of control (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005) over objectively uncontrollable stimuli 
(Linser & Goschke, 2007). Taken together, these studies suggest that guilt should be strongly 
related to perceived personal control, but yet this relationship has not been assessed directly. 
If guilt promotes a sense of control, then it follows that feeling guilt may actually 
promote risk-taking and more optimistic perceptions of future risk. Following work 
demonstrating incidental influences of emotion upon cognition (e.g., Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; 
Keltner, Horberg, & Oveis, 2006; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), we propose that guilt-driven risky 
tendencies should extend to judgments of risks that are irrelevant to the guilt-eliciting situation. 
We further argue that guilt should produce an illusion of control such that individuals feel FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       8 
personal control in objectively uncontrollable or chance-determined situations (Langer, 1975). 
Thus, in addition to testing the effects of guilt on perceived control and risk-taking, we examine 
whether our data are consistent with a model in which illusory control serves as mediator of the 
relationship between guilt and risk-taking.  
We conducted six studies to examine our predictions that guilt (a) promotes optimistic 
perceptions regarding risk, (b) increases preference for risks, and beliefs that one will engage in 
risk-taking behavior, and (c) increases perceived control over uncontrollable events. In Studies 5 
and 6, we tested whether our data is consistent with a model in which a guilt-induced sense of 
control mediates the effect of guilt on increased risk-taking tendencies. Additionally, in Study 6 
we assessed different appraisals associated with guilt and examined the effects of these specific 
appraisals on risk-taking in addition to guilt-induced illusory sense of control. 
Study 1: Guilt Enhances Optimistic Risk Estimates 
In Study 1, we examined whether induced guilt would produce more optimistic risk 
estimates compared to a neutral control condition as well as to sadness, a negatively-valenced 
control emotion. Following the appraisal tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), we 
selected sadness as a comparison emotion because it shares a negative valence with guilt and 
similarly involves negative appraisals of events, but differs on the appraisal of interest: 
controllability. Whereas guilt involves appraisals of one’s own control over an event, sadness is 
associated with appraisals of the uncontrollability of an event (Frijda et al., 1989). We also 
included a neutral control condition to demonstrate that guilt increases risk optimism as 
compared to a neutral baseline. Following Lerner and Keltner (2001), we measured optimistic 
risk by asking participants to estimate the likelihood that specific positive and negative events 
would occur in their lives. We predicted that the experience of guilt would increase optimistic FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       9 
risk estimates relative to sadness and the neutral control. 
Method 
Seventy-four students (45 males; Mage=23.9 years, SD=4.3) at a university in the western 
United States were randomly assigned to one of three emotion conditions (neutral, guilt, 
sadness). Following Tangney and colleagues (1996), participants in the guilt condition received 
the following instructions: 
Please recall a time in your personal life where you behaved in a way that made you feel 
guilt. Please describe the details about this situation that made you feel guilty. What was 
it like to be in this situation? What thoughts and feelings did you experience? Describe 
the situation and any thoughts, feelings you experienced. Please provide as many details 
as possible so that a person reading your entry would understand the situation and how 
you felt. 
Participants in the neutral condition were asked to describe a typical afternoon in writing. In the 
sadness condition, using instructions similar to the guilt condition, participants recalled a time in 
their personal lives where they behaved in a way that made them feel sad. 
After the written narrative, respondents completed the 6-item optimistic risk estimates 
scale from the Life Events Questionnaire (Winterich, Han, & Lerner, 2010; adapted from Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001) using a 7-point scale (1=very unlikely, 7=very likely). Sample items in this 
scale are “I could not find a job for six months” (reverse-coded) and “I had a heart attack before 
age 50” (reverse-coded). Items were averaged to form an optimistic risk estimates score (α=.75).  
Results 
As predicted, the manipulation affected participants’ risk estimates, F(2,71)=4.75, p=.01, 
partialη
2 = .12. Pairwise comparisons indicated that risk estimates were significantly more FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       10 
optimistic in the guilt condition (M=5.16, SD=.59) than in the sadness condition (M=4.47, 
SD=.95; t(48)=3.05, p=.003, d=.87) and were marginally higher as compared to the neutral 
condition (M=4.76, SD=.78; t(46)=1.98, p=.05, d=.58). The sadness and neutral conditions did 
not significantly differ in their influence on optimistic risk estimates.  
Study 2: Guilt Enhances Risk Preferences 
Study 1 demonstrated that incidental guilt influences the perception of risk. In Study 2, 
we examined whether guilt influences the preference for risks versus guaranteed payoffs. We 
predicted that the experience of guilt would increase risk preference relative to a neutral control. 
To further examine the generalizability of the influence of guilt on risk preferences, we used a 
different manipulation of guilt. 
Method 
Eighty-five individuals (40 males, Mage=31.7 years, SD=9.0) recruited through MTurk 
($1 payment) were randomly assigned to one of two emotion conditions (neutral, guilt). 
Following De Hooge and colleagues (2011), we induced guilt or a neutral state using the 
following computer task. Participants were informed that as part of a study on perceptions and 
reaction times, they would play two rounds of a performance task (ostensibly) with a partner; the 
combined performance of both partners could earn the pair $.50 each. In the first round, the 
performance bonus would be earned by the participant; in the second round, the performance 
bonus would be earned by their ostensible partner. (No participant reported suspicion that their 
counterpart was not real.) 
The partners then played a word game, Boggle, in which they were given a grid of letters 
and were asked to find words in sequences of adjacent letters in 30 seconds. Importantly, both 
partners needed to do well in order to reach the minimum level of points to get the bonus. After FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       11 
the first round, participants received feedback that they earned the bonus because of the good 
performance of both partners. After the second round, participants in the guilt condition were 
informed that the pair together earned less than the threshold of 100 points and thus their partner 
missed out on the bonus, whereas participants in the neutral condition were informed that their 
partner received the bonus because of both partners’ good performance.  
Next, to assess risk preferences, participants made four dichotomous choices for the 
following question: “Do you want a 50% chance of getting $800 OR $____ for sure?” 
(Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011). The amount ranged systematically from $100 
to $400 in $100 increments. The dependent measure consisted of the total number of risky 
options chosen by a participant (0–4). As an emotion manipulation check, similar to De Hooge et 
al. (2011), participants then rated on 7-point scales (1=not at all, 7=very much) how much guilt, 
shame, regret, disappointment, sadness, fear, and anger they felt after receiving the perception 
task feedback. 
Results 
Participants in the guilt condition reported greater guilt (M=3.98, SD=1.91) than did those 
in the neutral condition (M=1.45, SD=1.02), t(83)=7.58, p<.001, d=1.65, indicating that the 
manipulation was successful. In addition, participants in the guilt condition reported significantly 
greater guilt than other emotions, all ts(42)>4.10, ps<.01.  
We expected that guilt would lead participants to exhibit a greater preference for risks. 
Consistent with this prediction, participants in the guilt condition preferred greater risks 
(M=1.35, SD=1.36) than did those in the neutral condition (M=.76, SD=1.27), t(83)=2.06, p=.04, 
d=.45. 
Study 3: Guilt Increases the Sense of Control FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       12 
Study 2 provided evidence that guilt increases the preference for risks. In Study 3, we 
examined our prediction that guilt increases illusions of control such that individuals feel 
personal control in objectively uncontrollable situations. Here, we used a different manipulation 
of guilt, asking participants to put themselves in the shoes of a person experiencing guilt.  
Method 
One hundred-fifty MTurk participants (91 males, Mage=27.9 years, SD=7.8; $1 
compensation) were randomly assigned to experience guilt or a neutral state. All participants 
imagined being in a hurry because they wanted to get a special offer at a shop just before closing 
time (De Hooge et al., 2011). They were told that because they did not have any means of 
transportation, they had borrowed a friend’s bicycle, which was very special to him. In the guilt 
condition, participants were informed that when they left the shop, they found that the bicycle, 
which they forgot to lock, had been stolen. The story continued by telling participants that when 
they informed their friend about the stolen bike, he was very sad. In the neutral condition, 
participants returned the bicycle to their friend without incident.  
Next, participants completed an illusion of control measure (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, 
& Galinsky, 2009) by indicating their perceived control over four hard-to-control outcomes (e.g., 
“To what extent are you able to have some control over what happens in the economy?” α=.86) 
on 7-point scales (1=very little control, 7=a great deal of control). Participants then rated the 
emotion questions of Study 2 referring to how they felt at the end of the story on 7-point scales 
(1=not at all, 7=very much). Participants also completed the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), 
reporting how they felt at the end of the story on 5-point scales (1=very slightly or not at all, 
5=extremely). 
Results FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       13 
The guilt condition (M=6.32, SD=1.36) produced more feelings of guilt than did the 
neutral condition (M=2.49, SD=1.66), t(148)=15.48, p<.001, d=2.52, indicating that the 
manipulation of guilt was successful. Compared to participants in the neutral condition, those in 
the guilt condition reported more negative affect (Mguilt=2.64 vs. Mneutral=1.28, t(148)=10.85, 
p<.001, d=1.77) and less positive affect (Mguilt=1.98 vs. Mneutral=2.51, t(148)=3.68, p<.001, 
d=.60). Moreover, participants in the guilt condition reported experiencing significantly more 
guilt than other emotions, all ts(74)>2.26, ps<.05.  
As predicted, participants in the guilt condition felt a greater sense of control (M=2.62, 
SD=1.25) than did those in neutral condition (M=2.10, SD=1.04), t(148)=2.79, p=.006, d=.45. 
Study 4: Feelings of Guilt Increase Risk Preferences 
To add confidence to the assertion that feelings of guilt, rather than some other aspect of 
our manipulation, influence risk preferences, we tested whether a model with participants’ 
feelings of guilt as a mediator is consistent with the data to explain the influence of the guilt 
induction on an increased preference for risk. Moreover, consistent with Lerner and Keltner’s 
(2001) findings that negative affect does not account for emotion-specific risk effects, we used 
mediation analyses to test whether negative affect might explain the influence of guilt on risk 
preferences.  
Method 
Seventy students (44 males; Mage=24.5 years, SD=5.7) at a university in the western 
United States were randomly assigned to one of two emotion conditions (neutral, guilt), 
manipulated using a writing task as in Study 1. After the emotion induction, participants 
answered a few filler items. Next, we assessed risk preferences using the Griskevicius et al. 
(2011) gambling vs. sure thing choice task employed in Study 2. Finally, participants completed FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       14 
the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) and the state guilt items from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 
1994; “guilty,” “blameworthy,” “angry at self”; α=.90). For the above emotion items, 
participants reported how they felt during the emotion induction by rating each item on a 5-point 
scale (1=very slightly or not at all; 5=extremely). 
Results 
Participants in the guilt condition reported greater guilt (M=1.67, SD=.76) than did those 
in the control condition (M=1.20, SD=.24), t(68)=3.56, p=.001, d=.83, indicating that the 
manipulation was successful. In addition, participants in the guilt condition reported greater 
negative affect (M=1.82, SD=.63) than did those in the control condition (M=1.41, SD=.42), 
p=.002, d=.83. But the guilt condition did not have a significant effect on positive affect 
(Mguilt=2.82 vs. Mneutral=2.80, p=.93).   
Consistent with our predictions, participants in the guilt condition preferred greater risks 
(M=2.22, SD=1.22) as compared to those in the neutral condition (M=1.41, SD=1.37), 
t(68)=2.61, p=.01, d=.62. 
We found that a model with feelings of guilt as a mediator fit our data explains the 
influence of guilt on risk preferences (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The emotion condition had a 
statistically significant effect on feelings of guilt (b=.48, SE=.14, p<.001), which, in turn, 
significantly affected risk preference (b=.60, SE=.27, p=.03). The effect of our guilt 
manipulation was reduced (from b=.81, SE=.31, p=.01 to b=.52, p=.11) when feelings of guilt 
were included in the equation, and a bootstrap analysis (with 5,000 iterations) showed that the 
95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero [.053, 
.590]. Our data did not support negative affect as a potential mediator of the effect of the guilt 
condition on risk preference; the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       15 
indirect effect included zero [-.129, .351]. 
Study 5: The Role of Sense of Control in Explaining the Influence of Guilt on Risk-taking 
In Study 5, we tested whether our data is consistent with a model in which illusion of 
control mediates the relationship between guilt and risky behavior.  
Method 
Eighty-eight students (52 males, Mage=24.1 years, SD=5.9) at a university in the western 
United States were randomly assigned to one of two emotion conditions (neutral, guilt) using an 
emotion induction similar to that employed in Study 2 (here, lottery tickets were used as a bonus, 
and a red/green letter perception task was used instead of Boggle). Participants then completed 
measures of illusion of control and likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors. As in Study 2, we 
measured illusion of control (α=.92) by asking participants about their ability to control four 
hard-to-control outcomes. We assessed participants’ likelihood of engaging in risk-taking 
behaviors (α=.76) using the three items of financial gambling from the domain-speciﬁc risk-
taking scale (DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006), on a 7-point scale (1=extremely unlikely, 
7=extremely likely). A sample item is “Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting 
event.” As a manipulation check, participants rated how they felt after receiving the task 
feedback on the emotion-manipulation check items of Study 2 using 11-point scales (0=not at 
all, 10=very strongly). 
Results 
Participants in the guilt condition (M=6.16, SD=3.05) reported more feelings of guilt than 
did those in the neutral condition (M=1.70, SD=2.49), t(86)=7.50, p<.001, d=1.60, indicating that 
the manipulation of guilt was successful. Moreover, those in the guilt condition reported feeling 
significantly more guilt than other emotions, all ts(43)>2.00, ps<.05. FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       16 
As predicted, participants in the guilt condition indicated a greater likelihood to take risks 
(M=2.45, SD=1.08) than did those in neutral condition, (M=1.73, SD=1.61), t(86)=-2.44, p=.02, 
d=.53, and they also felt a greater sense of control (Mguilt=3.34, SD=1.43 vs. Mneutral=2.57, 
SD=1.32), t(86) =-2.56, p=.01, d=.60.  
A model with illusion of control as a mediator was consistent with our data (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004). The emotion condition had a statistically significant effect on sense of control 
(b=.76, SE=.29, p=.01), which, in turn, significantly affected risk-taking (b=.24, SE=.10, p=.02). 
The effect of the emotion manipulation on risk-taking was significantly reduced (from b=.71, 
SE=.30, p=.017 to b=.53, SE=.30, p=.08) when illusion of control was included in the equation, 
and a bootstrap analysis (with 5,000 iterations) showed that the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero [.010, .498]. 
Study 6: Guilt Appraisals 
Study 5 demonstrated that a model in which illusion of control serves as mediator for the 
relationship between guilt and risk-taking is consistent with our data. However, this does not rule 
out that other appraisals may better account for the influence of guilt on risk-taking. As noted 
earlier, guilt shares appraisals with negative emotions as well as with positive emotions. In Study 
6, we relied on prior literature (e.g., Ellworth & Scherer, 2003; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman et al., 
1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) to identify a host of appraisals associated with guilt. Here, we 
once again examined the influence of guilt on risk-taking, and then simultaneously tested several 
appraisals as potential mediators.   
Method 
One hundred forty mTurk participants (68 males, Mage=31.9 years, SD=8.5; $1 payment) 
were randomly assigned to receive the writing task induction of neutral or guilt from Study 1. FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       17 
Next, we assessed risk preferences using the Griskevicius et al. (2011) gambling vs. sure thing 
choice task employed in Study 2. Then, we measured the following appraisals in randomized 
order using 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scales (except where noted), beginning with the stem 
“In the events I described in the recall task…”: 
Illusory control. We assessed illusion of control using the three items from Study 3 (Fast 
et al., 2009; alpha=.86). 
Control. We assessed control appraisals using the following three items (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001): “To what extent did you feel that someone other than yourself had the ability to 
influence what was happening?”; “To what extent did you feel that someone else was to blame 
for what was happening?”; and “To what extent were the events beyond anyone’s control?” 
(alpha=.64) Appraisal of control helps us to examine whether illusion per se is important or not.  
Uncertainty. Uncertainty appraisals were assessed using three items (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985): “How well did you understand what was happening in the situation? (reverse-scored)”; 
“How well could you predict what was going to happen next?” (reverse-scored); and “How 
uncertain were you about what would happen in other situations?” (alpha=.62) 
Self-responsibility. Self-responsibility appraisals were assessed using three items: “How 
responsible did you feel for having brought about the events that you described in the recall 
task?”;“How responsible did you think someone or something other than yourself was for having 
brought about the events that you described in the recall task?” (reverse-scored; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985); and “Do you think that the cause of the events you described is due to 
something about you or to something about other people or circumstances?” (1=completely due 
to other people or circumstances; 7=completely due to me; Tracy & Robins, 2006; alpha=.69). 
Pleasantness. Pleasantness appraisals were assessed using two items (Smith & Ellsworth, FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       18 
1985): “How pleasant or unpleasant was it to be in this situation?”; and “How enjoyable was it to 
be in this situation?” (alpha=.90) 
Social-exchange. Emotions differ in assessment of the level of exchanges in a 
relationship, what someone does for others and what others do for them. Guilty people may feel 
that they have exploited somebody else or feel an obligation to repay another because of what 
they have done. Social-exchange appraisals were assessed using two items: “I felt a desire to 
repay the person/people I wronged”; and “I felt like I owed the person/people I wronged a debt” 
(alpha=.97). 
Assimilation/accommodation. Certain emotions promote the tendency to adapt one’s 
behavior to environmental demands (accommodation), whereas other emotions promote the 
tendency to behave according to internal traits and impulses (assimilation; Bless & Fiedler, 2006; 
Fiedler, 2001; see also Galinsky et al., 2008). Assimilation/accommodation appraisals were 
assessed using four items: “I was motivated to act to change the situation”; “I wanted to go 
against an obstacle or difficulty, or to conquer it”; “I felt that my actions should be influenced by 
the goals of others and/or by social norms” (reverse-scored); and “I felt that my behavior should 
be guided by my own goals and not by the goals of others” (alpha=.58) 
Approach/avoidance. Approach/avoidance appraisals were assessed using three items 
(Roseman et al., 1990): “At the time, were you reacting to the events you described mostly 
because you wanted to get or keep something pleasurable, or mostly because you wanted to get 
rid of or avoid something painful?” (1=mostly because I wanted to get or keep something 
pleasurable; 7=mostly because I wanted to get rid of or avoid something painful; reverse-
scored); “Did you want to minimize some cost in the events you described or maximize some 
benefit?” (1=very much wanted to minimize some cost; 7=very much wanted to maximize some FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       19 
benefit); and “Were you seeking less of something negative, or more of something positive?” 
(1=very much seeking less of something negative; 7=very much seeking more of something 
positive; alpha=.78). 
Results 
Four participants did not complete the writing task and were excluded from analyses. 
Consistent with our previous studies, participants in the guilt condition reported significantly 
greater likelihood to take risks (M=1.63, SD=1.29) than did those in neutral condition (M=1.04, 
SD=1.91), t(134)=-2.76, p=.007, d=.36, and they also showed higher mean levels of illusion of 
control that did not reach conventional levels of significance (Mguilt=2.28, SD=1.09 vs. 
Mneutral=1.98, SD=1.19), t(134) =-1.55, p=.12, d=.26. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
among the study variables are presented in Table 1.  
Three appraisals were significantly (illusion of control, r=.20, p=.02; uncertainty, r=.19, 
p=.03) or marginally (control, r=.15, p=.08) associated with risk-taking. To examine which 
appraisal best explained the influence of guilt on risk-taking, we used multiple mediation 
analysis (i.e., simultaneous mediation by multiple variables) with all the measured appraisals. 
Results with 5,000 bootstrap samples provided marginally significant support for a model in 
which illusion of control serves as mediator for the relationship between guilt and risk-taking; 
the 90% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include zero (.002, 
.202). In this simultaneous mediation model, no other appraisal reached marginal levels of 
significance as a potential mediator. In sum, among the appraisals that we tested, illusion of 
control best explains the effect of guilt on risk-taking. 
General Discussion 
Guilt is a powerful driver of behavior. The present studies demonstrate that feelings of FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       20 
guilt promote risk-taking. Across six studies, using behavioral and priming manipulations of 
guilt, we showed that guilt led to more optimistic risk perceptions (i.e., decreased risk estimates) 
(Study 1), preference for risky gambles versus guaranteed payoffs (Studies 2, 4, and 6), and the 
likelihood of engaging in risk-taking behaviors (Study 5). Consistent with appraisal analyses of 
guilt, we empirically demonstrated for the first time that guilt increases illusions of control over 
uncontrollable outcomes (Studies 3, 4, and 5). Additionally, we tested and found support for a 
model of the influence of guilt on increased risk-taking through enhanced illusory control 
(Studies 5 and 6). Finally, we examined different appraisals associated with guilt and the effects 
of these specific appraisals on risk-taking. 
Together, these results suggest that guilt can have important effects on individuals’ 
perceptions and behaviors related to risk. Importantly, all of the studies presented in this paper 
demonstrated incidental effects of guilt; that is, feelings of guilt generated by one cause impacted 
judgments that were completely irrelevant to the original cause of guilt. While we believe it is 
likely that feelings of guilt will also increase risk-taking for the purpose of atoning for one’s 
guilt-inducing behavior (i.e., integral emotion effects; e.g., Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007), the 
present studies demonstrate that the cognitive effects of guilt are more far-reaching. When 
individuals feel guilty, they are likely to view subsequent risk-related decisions through the lens 
of guilt, promoting increased feelings of control and a greater tendency to take risks (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
The present studies are the first to document an association between guilt and risk-taking, 
demonstrating that the experience of guilt impacts perceptions of risks, preference for risks, and 
the likelihood of engaging in risk-taking behavior. These findings provide an important 
extension of existing theory on guilt and behavior, which has focused on how guilt promotes FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       21 
moral behavior, actions aimed at reversing the effects of the guilt-inducing behavior, and/or 
relationship reparative actions (Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Here, we demonstrate 
that guilt promotes risk-taking and provide a broad framework for understanding why this 
occurs, showing that a guilt-produced enhanced sense of control lies at the root of guilt’s impact 
on the tendency to take risks.  
Our results also provide a more general explanation for why guilt may enact any type of 
behavior, including those treated in previous theory (e.g., Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge, 
2012): by enhancing the sense of control, guilt motivates people to act. While the present studies 
suggest this mechanism as a potential driver of guilt’s impact on risk-taking, future studies 
should seek to test a causal explanation more directly, and to test this explanation for guilt’s 
influence on other types of behavior. 
Our studies also make theoretical and empirical contributions to previous theoretical 
treatments of guilt and the sense of control. While previous research has posited that guilt 
involves appraisals of personal responsibility (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and action 
tendencies to atone for wrongdoing and make amends with those harmed (Frijda et al., 1989; 
Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney et al., 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006), the present work 
is the first to empirically demonstrate that the experience of guilt increases the sense of control. 
Sense of control is an important predictor of physical and mental well-being (Rodin, 1986); 
numerous studies, both correlational and experimental, have shown that a general sense of 
control leads to self-esteem, better health, and well-being (e.g., Lachman, 1986; Skinner, 1995). 
Our research advances prior work by showing that guilt can impact people’s perceived sense of 
control. These findings bridge the gap between previous theory and empirical evidence, and 
provide a potential explanation for guilt’s impact on behavior. FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       22 
More generally, our findings contribute to work examining how specific emotions impact 
risk perceptions, preferences, and risk-taking. Whereas certain emotions such as anger and 
happiness enhance risk-taking perceptions and tendencies, other emotions such as fear decrease 
the likelihood of risk-taking behavior (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Here, we show that guilt, a 
negative emotion associated with elevated levels of control, fits the profile of other risk-
enhancing emotions. This empirical contribution provides further support for a model of 
emotion-specific influences on risk, and also raises critical questions about the model. For 
example, given the present results as well as analyses demonstrating the centrality of control 
appraisals to decisions regarding risk (Slovic, 1987), how central are certainty appraisals to the 
previously observed fear and anger effects? Or might particular types of risky decisions map 
onto appraisals of certainty whereas others map onto appraisals of control? The present results 
also open the door to future investigations of other control-related emotions such as pride that 
may similarly impact risk perceptions, preferences, and risk-taking behavior.  
While the present studies provide the first evidence of the influence of states of guilt on 
risk-taking and sense of control, it is important to note that they did not investigate whether trait 
guilt (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011) similarly influences these constructs. Previous work 
on appraisal tendency has often found parallel cognitive effects of emotional traits and states on 
judgments (e.g., Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Oveis, 
Horberg, & Keltner, 2010). However, future work must test whether individuals who are 
dispositionally high in the tendency to experience guilt will exhibit similarly enhanced risk 
perceptions, risk preferences, and likelihood of engaging in risk. 
We acknowledge that the way we have operationalized and tested our theory in the 
reported experiments was not optimal in all respects. In fact, we measured control beliefs about FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       23 
different, hard-to-control outcomes and did not measure control beliefs about the outcomes of the 
risky decisions that we asked participants to make. In other words, we did not explicitly measure 
the control beliefs of the presented choices (e.g., the outcomes of financial gambles presented). 
Finally, our analyses show that sense of control as a mediator is consistent with our data, 
yet there could be other alternative explanations for the guilt-risky behavior link. For example, a 
hedonic account of guilt management could explain our findings. According to this hedonistic 
hypothesis, participants increase risk taking in the hopes of alleviating their feelings of guilt, to 
obtain a positive outcome that would counteract their guilt feelings. A negative outcome, instead, 
would be a deserved punishment that alleviates guilt. Future studies could test the potential for 
this and other alternative explanations for the effects of guilt on risk.   
Conclusion 
In demonstrating the impact of guilt on increased risk-taking and an enhanced sense of 
control, our research contributes to scholarship on guilt, to work on how emotions influence 
judgment, and to a better understanding of risk-taking and sense of control. By providing new 
insights into the parsing of negative emotions, we hope to spur future studies on the behavioral 
consequences of failing to live up to one’s personal standards.   FROM GUILT TO CONTROL AND RISK                       24 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 6 
Variable   Mean  s.d.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1. Risk-taking  1.34  1.27                 
2. Illusion of control  2.13  1.15  .20*               
3. Control   2.77  1.27  .15†  .21*             
4. Uncertainty  2.77  1.26  .19*  .13  .31***           
5. Responsibility  5.33  1.29  -.05  -.23**  -.66***  -.25**         
6. Pleasantness  4.20  1.95  -.02  .10  -.01  -.19*  .02       
7. Exchange  3.21  2.32  .12  .23**  .07  .44***  .07  -.23**     
8. Assimilation  3.35  1.19  .13  .21*  .29**  .26**  -.21*  -.14  .42***   
9. Approach  4.37  1.56  -.11  .10  -.14  -.36***  .05  .26**  -.38***  -.30*** 
N = 136.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 